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Abstract.  Insofar  as  many  Renaissance  thinkers  regard 
Aristotelian  philosophy  of  science  as  the  framework  for  their 
understanding of mathematics and its proofs, they consider geometrical 
proofs as syllogisms using causes. Furthermore, they identify geometrical 
proofs  as  demonstrationes  potissimae,  which  are  a  kind  syllogism  that 
provides both the cause and the effect of an event. By questioning this 
assumption,  Piccolomini  initiates  the  so-called  Quaestio  de  certitudine 
mathematicarum.  Several  scholars  agreed  with  him.  Others  either 
maintained that mathematical proofs are demonstrationes potissimae or tried 
to prove that at least some mathematical proofs satisfy the conditions for 
being  demonstrationes  potissimae.  Despite  their  differences  in  detail,  all 
participants in the debate recognized Aristotelian scientific theory as the 
norm. Yet even traditionally Aristotelian answers take on a new meaning 
by virtue of a new context. This marks the birth of a genuinely new 
debate  which  has  unwittingly  left  its  Aristotelian  roots  behind.  As  a 
result, geometrical proofs are no longer thought of as being based on 
causes  or  principles  of  being,  but  on  the  relationship  between  the 
different figures. Such a relationalism opens up the possibility of further 
development of mathematics. 
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Introduction: Relational and Causal Understanding of Mathematics 
In his Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume 
distinguishes two kinds of objects of human reason, namely relations of ideas and 
matters of fact. The propositions in geometry, algebra and arithmetic are of the first 
kind. Unlike the matters of fact, the relations of ideas are demonstratively certain.  
 
That the Square of the Hypothenuse is equal to the Squares of the two Sides, is a 
Proposition, that expresses a Relation betwixt these Figures. That three 
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times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a Relation betwixt these 
Numbers.  Propositions  of  this  Kind  are  discoverable  by  the  mere 
Operation  of  Thought,  without  Dependance  on  what  is  any  where 
existent in the Universe. Tho’ there never were a true Circle or Triangle 
in Nature, the Propositions, demonstrated by Euclid, would for ever 
retain all their Truth and Evidence.1 
What Hume expresses here, I want to call a relational understanding of mathematics, which 
is characterised by two main features. First of all, mathematical propositions are based 
on the internal relations between the mathematical objects. Secondly, this implies a 
flexible stance towards mathematics’ ontological foundation. A historically important 
counter-model is causal understanding of mathematics. Its point of reference is Aristotle’s 
theory of science as set out in the Posterior Analytics: “According to Aristotle, full-
fledged  scientific  knowledge  of  something  requires  understanding  its  necessitating 
causes; this knowledge is produced or best manifested by demonstrative syllogism.”2 
Knowledge here means knowledge of the cause in the sense of Aristotle’s 
four causes (aitia). The four causes can be regarded as four types of explanations why the 
thing in question is how it is.3 Unlike the relationalism, the Aristotelian understanding 
of  mathematics  implies  a  strict  ontological  foundation  for  mathematics  and 
mathematical proofs, insofar as mathematical propositions are based on such causes.  
More precisely, the Aristotelians regard the mathematical objects themselves (and not 
the relations between them) as such causes. Via abstraction, mathematical objects are 
dependent on their instances in the world. The relationalists base mathematical proofs 
on the relations between the figures and on the particular construction of each figure; 
the Aristotelians base mathematical proofs on the mathematical objects gained via 
abstraction.  
  From the 13th century to the Renaissance, Aristotelian philosophy of science 
is the umbrella concept for the understanding of mathematical method and proof, 
providing its terminological framework (although scholars in the period combine the 
Aristotelian  concept  of  science  with  other  approaches).4  In the 17 th  century,  the 
Aristotelian understanding of mathematics gets replaced by a relational understanding. 
The latter is a prerequisite for various scientific achievements of modern times.  
  One such scientific achievement is the advent of non-Euclidean geometry. 
Because  Aristotelian  mathematics  relies  on  abstraction  from  experience  (and 
experience  shows  non-Euclidean  geometry  to  be  (psychologically)  impossible5), it 
cannot  allow  for  the  possibility  of  a  non -Euclidean  geometry.  However,  with 
reference to its logical consistenc y, non-Euclidean geometry is logically possible. 6 
Thus, in the long run, the relational understanding of mathematics was a preliminary 
condition for the recognition of the non-Euclidean geometry. Based on the relational 
understanding of geometry, we can, t herefore, accept the logical possibility of non -
Euclidean geometry.7 In the shorter term, the relational understanding of mathematics 
enabled  some  scientific  achievements  of  the  17 th  century,  particularly  the 
mathematization of non-mathematical sciences and the algebraisation of geometry. 
Within  strict  Aristotelianism,  all  scientific  disciplines,  however,  have  their  unique  
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subject  areas,  and  hence  the  methods  of  one  discipline  cannot  be  applied  to  the 
subject  area  of  another  discipline.  Therefore,  it  was  the  break  with  Aristotelian 
understanding of science and mathematics that allowed for several breakthroughs, not 
least the so-called “scientific revolution.”8 
  My paper deals specifically with the break away from the Aristotelian causal 
theory of geometry and geometrical proof. I want to demonstrate that this break 
emerged  within  the scholastic  Aristotelianism  itself  in  the second  half  of  the  16th 
century – in the prehistory of scientific revolution.  
  During the Renaissance there was a growing interest in mathematical method. 
On the one hand, this was caused by the mathematical problems that craftsmen had 
to deal with as a consequence of their practical needs. On the other hand, it was a 
product of renewed interest in non-Aristotelian ancient mathematical writings (such as 
Euclid’s  Elements  and  Proclus’  commentary  on  Euclid),  which  were  extensively 
published in new, translated editions at the time.9 Many actors were important in such 
developments, but the school of Padua played a decisive role within the discu ssions 
about method and mathematics.10 For the Paduan scholars, as for most Renaissance 
thinkers, Aristotelian philosophy of science (rather its scholastic version than the 
original one) is the umbrella concept for their understanding of mathematical method 
and proof. In the early modern period, many philosophers of mathematics either 
regarded geometrical proofs as syllogisms or thought that they should be reformulated 
as syllogisms.11 In most cases, geometrical proofs were equated with a specific kind of 
Aristotelian proof, namely the demonstratio potissima (a kind of syllogism that provides 
both the cause and the effect of an event; more detailed explanation in chap. 2.2 
below). As a critical response to this approach, the Paduan philosopher Alessandro 
Piccolomini  (1508–1579)  initiated  a  debate  that  came  to  be  called  the  Quaestio  de 
certitudine mathematicarum. This is the starting point for my investigation of the shift 
from causes to relations in mathematical thinking. 
  The  Quaestio  de  certitudine  deals  with  three  interrelated  questions.  First,  it 
questions  the  certainty  of  mathematics  in  general.  Since  mathematical  certitude  is 
traditionally  justified  by  the  special  character  of  mathematical  proofs,  the  initial 
argument  focuses  on  the  second  question:  whether  or  not  there  is  a  place  in 
mathematics  for  the  demonstratio  potissima.  (I  use  the  epithet  “initial”  in  order  to 
distinguish the 16th century quaestio from its revival in the 17th century.) In the course 
of the debate, these initial questions increasingly lose their relevance. More and more, 
attention shifts to the third question: “whether the actual procedure of geometers in 
proving  theorems  and  solving  problems  could  be  reconciled  with  Aristotle’s 
description  of  a  demonstrated  science.”12  Such  a  procedure  was  mainly  based  on 
Euclid’s Elements. Therefore, the real subject of the discussion is the incompatibility of 
Euclidean geometry with the Aristotelian understanding of science.  
  The initial debate is a symptom of the contradictions within the traditional 
preconditions  of  the  understanding  of  geometry,  namely  the  lack  of  distinction 
between Aristotelian proofs and geometrical method.13 In fact, the debate about the 
certainty of mathematics shows the inadequacy of using the criteria of Aristotelian 
proof theory to describe mathematical proofs. From a present -day perspective, the  
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debate is based on completely misguided assumptions. No consensus was reached, 
and  conflicts  were  not  resolved.  However,  although  all  participants  in  the  debate 
remained  firmly  within  the  Aristotelian  framework,  a  new  concept  of  geometrical 
proof  ex negativo emerged in the discussion. The initial discussion has a scholastic 
nature,  admittedly,  but  as  it  progresses,  the  Aristotelian  understanding  of  science 
grows  increasingly  vague.  This  lay  the  groundwork  for  a  non-Aristotelian 
understanding  of  geometry  with  attempts  to  reformulate  Euclidean  geometry  by 
means of Aristotelian tools. As understood by an Aristotelian, geometry is supposed 
to explain single geometric figures in terms of their unique causes. The new concept 
of geometrical proof, however, emphasizes the relations between figures and focuses 
the debate on the practice of geometrical constructions. This concept of geometrical 
proof carries changes in the understanding of geometry in general within itself. When 
scholars such as Gassendi, Wallis, Hobbes and Barrow take up the debate again in the 
17th  century,  they  are  no  longer  interested  in  the  question  of  whether  there  are 
demonstrationes potissimae in geometry, and they are equally uninterested in rescuing the 
Aristotelian framework. Insofar as they adopt some questions and arguments of the 
initial debate, they take on the relational understanding of geometry.  
  I am going to trace the shift from causes to relations in three steps. In the 
first,  I  will  outline  the  Aristotelian  background  of  the  debate,  in  particular,  the 
traditional justifications of mathematical certainty. More specifically, I shall set out the 
features of the demonstratio potissima. In the second step, I am going to sketch the main 
positions in the Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum. In the third, I want to display the 
new concept of geometrical proof which looms up in the discussion. In the course of 
this, I will sketch out the quaestio’s revival in the 17th century and contextualise it: I will 
consider  the  relational  understanding  of  geometrical  proof  in  the  context  of  the 
overall development in mathematical thinking of this period.  
 
2. The Background: Aristotelian Justifications of the Certainty of Mathematics 
In the philosophy of mathematics during the early modern period, we can 
identify two justifications for mathematical certainty.14 The first strategy justifies the 
objective  certainty  of  mathematics  by  means  of  the  ontological  status  of  their 
entities (2.1). The second strategy deduces the subjective certainty of mathematics from 
the character of mathematical proofs (2.2). The second strategy is the more important 
for the purposes of this paper. Hence, after giving a short explanation of the first, I 
will concentrate on the second strategy. 
 
2.1. The Ontological Status of Mathematical Entities 
The  first  strategy  is  used  by,  for  example,  Thomas  Aquinas.15  Following 
Aristotle, he regards mathematical entities as  abstractions based on sense experience. 
From  the  ontological  status  of  mathematical  entities,  Thomas  concludes  that 
mathematics is more certain than both natural philosophy and theology. This is so, 
because,  unlike  natural  philosophy,  mathematics  does  not  deal  with  matter  and 
motion; unlike theology, mathematics considers entities which are given to the senses  
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and to the imagination. To put it in a nutshell, insofar as mathematical entities are 
created by abstraction, they have the highest level of clarity and evidence. 
 
2.2. The Use of the Demonstratio Potissima 
The second strategy bases mathematical certainty on the characteristics of the 
proofs used in mathematics. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle envisions science as 
true  knowledge  gained  via  reasons  or  causes.16  Furthermore,  he  maintains  that 
mathematical disciplines produce proof by use of a syllogism  in the first figure,17 which 
has the following form:  
 
maior:  middle term (M) – predicate (P). 
minor:  subject (S) – middle term (M). 
conclusio:  subject (S) – predicate (P). 
 
In the early modern period, only a few philosophers of mathematics drew a 
distinction between geometrical proof and the Aristotelian syllogism.18 Most of them 
classify geometrical proofs as  demonstrationes  potissimae,  which  are  regarded  as  the 
highest and most certain type of proof. I will explain this type of proof by comparing 
it with the two other types, namely the demonstratio quia and the demonstratio propter 
quid.19 
  All three types of proof are regarded as a syllogism in the first figure. The 
demonstratio quia infers the cause from its effect. This kind of proof can be illustrated 
by an example from the Posterior Analytics.20 
 
maior:  Non-twinkling heavenly bodies (M) are near earth (P). 
minor:  Planets (S) are non-twinkling heavenly bodies (M). 
conclusio:  Planets (S) are near earth (P). 
Its middle term is the unique effect (effectus proprius). It signifies the (observed) 
effect, namely that these heavenly bodies do not twinkle. By rearranging this syllogism, 
we get the demonstratio propter quid. 
 
maior:  Heavenly bodies which are near earth (M) do not twinkle (P). 
minor:  Planets (S) are heavenly bodies which are near earth (M). 
conclusio:  Planets (S) do not twinkle (P). 
 
The demonstratio propter quid infers the effect from its proximate cause.21 Its 
middle term signifies the proximate cause of the effect, in our example the proximity 
to the earth. (Of course, the middle term of such a proof is understood as one of the 
four causes in the Aristotelian sense.) 
  At this point, Aristotle leaves us. He distinguishes only these two kinds  of 
proof. But following Averroes, Aristotelians assume a third type of proof, namely 
demonstratio potissima.22 Such a proof infers the effect (esse) and the cause (the propter quid 
effectus) from fundamental premises.23 It is a syllogism that provides both the cause and  
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the effect of an event by using a middle term which specifies the proximate cause of 
the effect in a unique way.24 
  The primary, as well as the secondary literature, usually content themselves 
with giving an abstraction explication of the  demonstratio potissima, but they do not 
provide  an  actual  example  of  a  demonstratio  potissima.25  There  are  two  possible 
interpretations. Following the first interpretation, we get the  demonstratio potissima by 
another  rearrangement  of  the  syllogisms  above.  According  to  the  second 
interpretation, the demonstratio potissima is just a variant of the demonstratio propter quid. 
There is only one possibility for further rearranging the syllogisms above: 
 
maior:  Planets (M) are near the earth (P). 
minor:  Not twinkling heavenly bodies (S) are planets (M). 
conclusio:  Not twinkling heavenly bodies (S) are near the earth (P). 
 
Indeed, the resulting syllogism does not fulfil all requirements for being a 
demonstratio  potissima.  Therefore,  it  would  be  more  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
demonstratio potissima is nothing but a variant of the demonstratio propter quid which is only 
accidentally distinguished from the demonstratio propter quid in the proper sense.26 If so, 
it would be a  demonstratio  propter  quid  in  which  the  effect  is  unknown.  Being  a 
demonstratio potissima would depend on the previous knowledge of the recipient. 
  Despite the problems concerning the interpretation of this kind of proof, 
Aristotelian philosophers of mathematics base the certainty of mathematics on its use 
of the demonstratio potissima as the most certain type of proof. They regard it as the 
most certain type of proof because it provides us with the cause and its effect at once. 
However,  the  equivalence  of  mathematical  proof  and  demonstratio  potissima  was 
essentially contested.27 It was this that led Piccolomini to initiate the debate, Quaestio de 
certitudine mathematicarum. Within the framework of this debate, even the traditionally 
Aristotelian answers take on a new meaning by virtue of a new context. This marks 
the birth of a genuinely new debate which has unwittingly left its Aristotelian roots 
behind. I am not interested in the result of the initial Aristotelian debate, not least 
because  there  was  no  real  final  solution.  Rather,  my  interest  lies  in  the  relational 
understanding of geometry and geometrical proof which looms in the background of 
the debate. 
3. Main Positions in the Initial Debate About Certainty in Mathematics 
The subject of the Quaestio is the question of the certainty of mathematics. 
Nevertheless, the initial debate focuses on the question of whether geometrical proofs 
can  be  identified  as  demonstrationes  potissimae.  From  a  logical  point  of  view,  three 
possible positions can be distinguished in the debate.28 The first group defends the 
identification thesis: according to the traditional position (e.g., Hieronymus Balduinus, 
Jacob Schegk (1511–1587)), all geometrical proofs are demonstrationes potissimae. The 
second  group  denies  the  identification  of  geometrical  proofs  and  demonstrationes 
potissimae (2.1). The critics (e.g., Alessandro Piccolomini (1508–1579), Simon Simonius 
(1522–1602),  Benedictus  Pererius  (1535–1610),  the  Jesuits  of  Coimbra,  Martin  
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Smiglecius  (1562/1564–1618))  claim  that  no  geometrical  proofs  are  demonstrationes 
potissimae.  The  moderate  defenders  (e.g.,  Franciscus  Barocius  (1537–1604),  Joseph 
Blancanus (1566–1624)), as the third group, maintain that at least some geometrical 
proofs are demonstrationes potissimae (2.2). After Piccolomini’s commentarium de certitudine 
mathematicarum disciplinarum (1547), the first position maintained very few proponents.29 
The debate mainly takes place between the critics and the moderate defenders. To 
characterize these positions in more detail, I will focus less on their specific arguments 
and more on their assumptions and the implications of their arguments. I will start 
with the positions of the critics. 
 
3.1. Critics: No Mathematical Proofs are Demonstrationes potissimae 
As one of the critics, Piccolomini’s arguments define the debate.30 The critics 
of the identification thesis often further refine his arguments and investigate their 
implications. Piccolomini shows that geometrical demonstrations are no proofs by any 
of the four causes.31 
  a) Geometrical demonstrations are not proofs by efficient cause (causa efficiens) 
because mathematics does not deal with action.32 Many of Piccolomini’s arguments 
are based on the assumption that the geometrical objects understood as pure quantity 
(quantitas) have no relation to action (actio).33 Simonius (Antischegkianorum Libernus, 304 
and 310) follows this argument in a very peculiar way. He believes that there are 
demonstrationes potissimae used in mathematics with the formal cause as middle term. But 
he regards only the proofs from the efficient cause as the most perfect.34 
  b) Geometrical demonstrations are not proofs by final cause ( causa finalis).35 
Of course, mathematics does have purposes, insofar as it is useful for various 
applications. But there are no final causes within mathematics. Piccolomini argues that 
only activities have purposes and therefore final causes. But mathematical objects are 
immutable. Where there is no change, there can be no purpose (of change). 
  c) Geometrical demonstrations are not proofs by material cause (causa materialis) 
because there is no real matter (materia realis) in mathematics.36 Mathematics just deals 
with intelligible matter (materia intelligiblis) created by abstraction. 
  d) Geometrical demonstrations are not proofs by formal cause (causa formalis). 
Since Piccolomini attacks the traditional view here, its refutation takes up the largest 
room within his arguments by far. Looking at the progress of the debate, we can 
identify  two  influential  arguments  against the  use  of formal  causes  in  geometrical 
proofs.  
  To begin with, the middle term of every demonstratio potissima has to be the 
definition of the subject or of its property (definitio vel subiecti vel passionis).37 Piccolomini 
shows that geometrical proofs do not use such a middle term, by referring to Euclid’s 
demonstration that the angle sum in a triangle equals two right angles (see below fig. 
1).38 The demonstration (Euclid I.32) in short is as follows. AB is parallel to CE. 
Therefore,  the  alternate  angles  BAC  and  ACE  equal  one  another  and  the 
corresponding angles ABC and ECD equal one another. Accordingly, the angle ACD 
equals the sum of the angles BAC and ABC; and thus the sum of the interior angles 
equals the sum of the angles ACD and ACB. Since the sum of the angles ACD and  
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ACB equals two right angles, the sum of the interior angles equals the sum of two 
right angles. 
 
Fig. 1 
 
  Obviously,  this  demonstration  makes  use  of  the  exterior  angle.  Proclus 
already  questions  whether  this  proof  uses  (real)  causes.39  Following  Proclus, 
Piccolomini shows that the exterior angle is neither a definition of the triangle itself 
nor of one of its properties. The exterior angle is not part of the triangle’s definition. 
Even if the exterior angle did not exist, it would still be a triangle. 
  Furthermore, the demonstratio potissima requires a middle term which signifies a 
unique  and  proximate  cause.40  Piccolomini emphasizes that there is  no  hierarchy  of 
priorities  between  the  mathematical  properties  with  respect  to  their  dependencies. 
Instead, one theorem can be proven by different premises.41 One middle term used in 
a proof is neither more unique nor more proximate than another possible middle 
term.  
  While Piccolomini does indeed justify the certainty of mathematics by means 
of the nature of its entities, 42 the critical part of his argumentation was significantly 
more influential. Several scholars agreed with Piccolomini in one respect or another.43 
Alongside  various  refinements  of  Piccolomini’s  observations,  two  main  arguments 
evolved. Each is deeply connected with the other.  
  The first argument is based on the distinction between the principle of Being 
(principium  essendi)  and  the  epistemological  principle  (principium  cognoscendi).44  Geometric 
proofs do not use principles of Being insofar as they do not use re al causes. Instead, 
they use only the second one, the epistemological principles, in the sense that the 
proofs rely on reasons for understanding. We understand or comprehend a figure’s 
properties  by  its  construction.  Indeed,  a  strict  Aristotelian  does  not  regard  its 
construction as the cause of its properties. The construction only provides us with a 
principle of understanding. By contrast, a principle of Being of a figure’s properties 
would be its cause in an ontological sense.  
  The second argument is based on the distinction between the  essence of a 
geometric figure and its relations to other figures. Many of Euclid’s proofs demonstrate 
properties of one geometric figure by using its relations to other figures. But a figure’s  
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relation to other figures does not belong to its essence; nor are any of these relations 
unique  and  proximate  causes,  since  there  is  no  hierarchy  of  priorities  between 
mathematical properties with respect to their dependencies. Thus, geometric proofs 
do not follow from the essences of figures. I am going to illustrate this argument in 
reference to Euclid’s construction of an equilateral triangle (see below fig. 2).45 The 
task is to construct an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line AB. To do this, 
we have to describe the circle BCD with centre A and radius AB and the circle ACE 
with centre B and radius BA. Their point of intersection C has the same distance AB 
to A and to B. Therefore, the triangle ABC is equilateral. 
 
Fig. 2 
 
  Euclid  uses  here  the  circle,  or  its  definition,  in  order  to  construct  the 
equilateral triangle and to demonstrate its properties. In this respect, being equilateral 
is  not  proven  by  the  essence  of  the  triangle  but  by  its  relation  to  other  figures. 
Smiglecius (1562/1564–1618) refines this argument. In my English translation, I make 
its syllogistic structure explicit. My primary interest is not the conclusio but the minor. 
 
[maior:]  In  the  demonstratio  potissima,  the  cause  of  the  property  or 
characteristic is the essence of the subject from which the properties 
originate. 
[minor:]  In  Mathematics,  the  properties  are  not  derived  from  the 
essence of the subject, but from the relations to other figures. 
[conclusio:] Geometrical proofs do not demonstrate properties by using 
the real cause of the essence or Being.46 
 
Pererius, among others, radicalized Piccolomini’s theses and arguments by 
denying mathematics the status of science.47 Geometrical proofs do not prove by real 
causes (in the sense of principles of being), and in Aristotelian philosophy of science, 
proving by causes is a requisite for being a science. Geometrical proofs do not fulfil 
this condition and therefore mathematics is not a science in an Aristotelian sense. This 
is the point at which the moderate defenders enter the debate.  
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3.2.  Moderate  Defenders:  Some  Mathematical  Proofs  are  Demonstrationes 
potissimae 
Many philosophers in the 16th and early 17th centuries did not want to accept 
the consequence that mathematics (the prime example of a science) should not be a 
science at all. So, the more moderate defenders, such as Barozzi (aka Barocius) and 
Blancanus (aka Biancani) tried to prove that at least some mathematical proofs satisfy 
the conditions for being a demonstratio potissima.48 In order to do this, they have to show 
that the middle terms of these proofs signify the unique and proximate cause of the 
property in question. Commonly, they regard the middle terms as definitions which 
denote formal or material causes.49 
  Blancanus discusses the two paradigms of geometrical proofs in the debate 
and comes to the following result. In his opinion, the equilateral triangle (Euclid I.1) is 
proven by formal cause, insofar as he regards the definition of the circle as a formal 
cause.50 He takes the proof of the triangle’s angle sum (Euclid I.32) as a proof by 
material cause, insofar as it is a conclusion from the parts to the whole.51 
  His arguments are based on a very peculiar notion of definitions in geometry. 
While the critics usually conceive of such definitions as being  nominal,  Blancanus 
argues that in geometry definitions are nominal as well as real at the same time.52 But 
furthermore, he points out that these definitions denote the reason ( ratio) or cause 
(causa) of the figure in question.53 He labels them as causal definitions (definitiones causales), 
that is, genetic definitions.54 Prior to Blancanus, definitio causalis was a definition of an 
attribute as an equivalent to the real definition of the subject term. Blancanus’ use of 
the  term  definitio  causalis  is  beyond  the  scope  of  its  traditional  use,  insofar  as  he 
accentuates the constructive function of such causal definitions. His example is the 
definition of a square: he takes it to be the definition that designates the cause for 
being a square. In many places, Blancanus blurs the distinction between the definition 
and the construction of a figure.  
  By assuming causal definitions, Blancanus introduces causes into geometry 
and  into  geometrical  proofs.  With  his  peculiar  view  of  geometric  definitions  and 
constructions, Blancanus undermines the two major presuppositions of the critical 
objections. On the one hand, he calls into question the distinction between principles 
of Being and epistemological principles. On the other, the distinction between the 
essence of a geometric figure and its relations to other figures becomes debatable. For 
example,  some  critics  object  that  the  demonstration  of  the  equilateral  triangle 
proceeds from the definition of the circle, which is not part of the essence of such a 
triangle. In contrast to this, Blancanus regards the whole construction as part of the 
concept of the figure.55 
  With this in mind, the Being of geometrical figures  is their construction, and 
Blancanus subverts the two distinctions. Within Blancanus’ theory, both distinctions 
cannot be applied meaningfully to mathematical objects because the geometric figures 
depend  less  on  abstraction  but  more  on  definition  and  construction.  In  this 
perspective, principles of Being and epistemological principles coincide in geometry, 
insofar as there are no geometrical figures beyond their construction.  
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  With  his  ‘rescue’  of  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  proof,  Blancanus  gets  into 
trouble.  Like  the  critics,  he  insists  on  Aristotelian  abstraction  as  the  source  of 
geometrical  figures.56  Yet, Aristotelian abstraction is not entirely compat ible with 
Blancanus’ concepts of definition and of construction.57 Either the geometrical proofs 
are created by abstraction from experienced objects or they are constituted by causal 
definitions and geometrical constructions. It seems to be that Blancanus just needs the 
abstraction for the creation of the most basic elements like points and lines, while the 
more  complex  figures  like  squares  or  triangles  depend  on  their  definitions.  In 
legitimating the subjective certainty of mathematics, Blancanus subverts the justification 
of its objective certainty. The consequence is that his rescue of the Aristotelian view of 
mathematics fragments precisely the Aristotelian view of mathematics. 
 
4. A New Concept of Geometrical Proof 
Such a level of detail in differences implies significant common ground. All 
participants of the initial debate recognize the Aristotelian scientific theory as the 
norm. The characteristics of mathematical proofs are only recognizable against the 
background of different kinds of proofs and “proof theories.” The starting point for 
the  debate  is  the  discovery  that  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  proof  and  Euclid’s 
geometric demonstrations are incompatible. However, no participant in the debate 
explicitly rejects the Aristotelian theory of proof.  
  Considering the Aristotelian framework of the initial debate, one can dismiss 
it as a purely scholastic one. But that does not mean that it has no relevance for the 
further development of mathematical theory. This debate is where the foundations for 
the acceptance of a relational understanding of geometry (4.1) were laid. Certainly, 
some  questions  discussed  in  the  Quaestio  de  certitudine  lose  their  relevance  when 
Aristotelian logic is abandoned as “the language of science.”58 This mainly pertains to 
the question of whether demonstrationes potissimae are used in mathematics. And yet, 
some  non-Aristotelian  scholars  restage  the  debate  in  the  17th  century (4.2).  These 
scholars, indeed, abandoned some preconditions of the initial debate, and therefore 
transformed its initial question. They changed it even more, by adopting the relational 
understanding of geometrical proof. This shift from causes to relations fits into a 
general shift to structures in mathematical thinking which I want to outline as a last 
point (4.3). 
 
4.1. The Relational Understanding of Geometrical Proof 
Within the debate, a new concept of geometrical proof emerges, distinguished 
by two characteristics.  
  1) First of all, the arguments of the critics as well as of the defenders imply a 
growing degree of flexibility towards geometry’s ontological foundations. The critics emphasize that 
geometrical proofs are just based on epistemological principles, instead of principles 
of  Being.  Defenders  like  Blancanus  blur  the  distinction  between  epistemological 
principles  and  principles  of  Being.  In  doing  so,  Blancanus  rejects  Aristotelian 
abstraction as the ontological foundation of mathematics. By breaking away from the 
ontological  foundation  of  mathematics,  he  opens  up  the  possibility  of  applying  
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mathematics  to  non-mathematical  contexts,  whereas  within  the  Aristotelian 
framework, scientific disciplines are separated by their different and unique subject 
areas.  Only  the  mixed  sciences  are  mathematized  since  they  are  subordinated  to 
mathematical disciplines; optics, for example, is subordinated to geometry.59 But in 
Aristotelian understanding, the philosophy of nature is not mathematized. 
  2) Furthermore, critics like Piccolomini and Smiglecius are not satisfied with 
the mere statement that geometrical proofs do not m eet the requirements of an 
Aristotelian proof. In addition, they seek to explain how mathematical proofs work, 
and in the process, they emphasize the role of internal relationships within geometry 
itself: Geometrical proofs are not based on a hierarchy of  causes. The proofs in 
geometry argue primarily on the basis of the relationships between the different 
figures. According to this, geometrical proofs are based on relations and coherence. 
Such a view does not fit into the Aristotelian framework, insofar as  geometric proofs 
in an Aristotelian sense have to proceed from the essence of the subject (as its unique 
and proximate cause). This objection from the critics presupposes the distinction 
between the essence of a geometrical figure and its relation to other figures. Blancanus 
wants to rescue Aristotelian proof theory by blurring this distinction. Finally, this is 
where a concept of geometrical proof which focuses on the internal structure of 
geometry and the practice of geometrical constructions emerges. 
 
4.2. The Revival of the Debate 
When scholars such as Pierre Gassendi, John Wallis, Thomas Hobbes and 
Isaac Barrow take up the debate again in the 17th century,60 “it is mathematics that is 
the  paradigm  of  science  and  its  reasoning  the  paradigm  of  scientific 
demonstrations.”61  Given  this  fundamental  change,  the  debate  no  longer  has  any 
interest  in  rescuing  Aristotelianism.  Gassendi  and  Barrow  explicitly  discuss  the 
certainty of mathematics in the context of scepticism.62 Wallis, Hobbes and Barrow 
modify the Aristotelian conditions for demonstrations in order to rescue the certainty 
of mathematics and its status as a science. Compared to the positions in the initial 
debate, the strategies of their arguments bear some similarity to Blancanus’ arguments, 
especially when they conceive of the definitions and the constructions themselves as 
the cause of the figures.63 We can take Hobbes as an example. Despite his criticism of 
Aristotelian philosophy, he abides by the Aristotelian idea that knowledge is causal 
knowledge. Indeed, he amalgamates the concept of causal knowledge with that of 
maker’s knowledge. 
 
[T]he science of every subject is derived from a precognition of the 
causes,  generation  and  construction  of  the  same;  and  consequently 
where the causes are known, there is place for demonstration, but not 
where the causes are to seek for. Geometry therefore is demonstrable, 
for the lines and figures which we reason are drawn and described by 
ourselves, and civil philosophy is demonstrable, because we make the 
commonwealth ourselves. But because of natural bodies we know not 
the  construction,  but  seek  it  from  the  effects,  there  lies  no  
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demonstration of what the causes be we seek for, but only of what they 
may be.64 
 
Obviously, Hobbes’ conception of causal knowledge does not really match 
the Aristotelian conception. By combining causal and maker’s knowledge, he subverts 
the distinction between epistemological principles and principles of Being. By doing 
this, he puts the emphasis on the construction of the figure – much like Blancanus. 
Like the other proponents of the debate’s second active period, Hobbes does indeed 
reject most of the Aristotelian framework. 
 
4.3. The General Shift to Structures in Mathematical Thinking 
Both the initial debate and its revival use a concept of geometrical proof that 
focuses  on  the  internal  structure  of  geometry  and  the  practice  of  geometrical 
construction.  Such  an  understanding  of  geometrical  proof  is  in  tune  with  general 
developments in the mathematics of the early modern period.  
  Parallel to the debate in geometry, a sea change took place in arithmetic and 
algebra, instigated by the introduction of the decimal number system.65 Arithmetic 
broke  away  from  the  classical  concept  of  numbers,  which  is  oriented  towards 
counting. The new understanding of numbers regarded them as constituted by the 
structure of the (positional) number system. The system generates the mathematical 
entities insofar as the symbols are relationally defined. In 1591,  François  Viète 
published his  In  artem  analyticam  Isagoge,  in  which  he  designs  his  algebra  speciosa,66 
according to which, the solution of an equation consists of formal transformations, 
which are based on transformation rules and the relations between the symbols. This 
process inherently disregards the referents o f the symbols. Viète enables general 
solution methods with uninterpreted symbols. Such methods do not depend on 
experienced objects. Instead, the interpretation of the symbols depends on the system 
within  which  we  operate. 67  Such  a  relationalism  enables  pure  formal  or  syntactical 
reasoning, which is the characteristic of algebraic and arithmetic reasoning in modern 
times.68 
  In contrast to this, the type of proof used in geometry is  content-based  or 
semantic.69 The axiomatic proofs in Euclid’s geometry proceed from definitions, axioms 
and already proven theorems. Geometric proofs are related to the geometric figures 
and their spatial features. An (exaggeratedly) strict Aristotelian would regard geometry 
as a set of unrelated figures.  
  However, the participants of the debate concerning mathematical certainty 
put the emphasis much more on the role of the relations between the figures and on 
the construction of them with respect to their definitions. This presupposes a more 
flexible stance towards geometry’s ontological foundation. In doing this, they bring 
geometric  proof  closer  to  arithmetic  proof.  They  lay  the  foundations  for  the 
algebraisation of geometry. More precisely, the shift from causes to relations creates an 
intellectual climate which enables the acceptance of such an algebraisation. In this sense, 
a relational picture of geometry is a precondition of Descartes’ analytical geometry 
and, in a way, of Leibniz’ calculus.   
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  Within Descartes’ analytic geometry, the criterion for mathematical existence 
is not abstraction from experience but constructability. Descartes transfers arithmetics 
and algebra onto geometry. According to his understanding of geometry, its subject 
area  is  based  on  the  construction  of  figures,  which  he  reduces  to  arithmetic 
operations.70 This program is grounded in the relations between the lines of a figure. 
The  relationalism  inspired  by  the  algebra  is  the  presupposition  of  Descartes’ 
epistemology and metaphysics, insofar as he, in his Regulae, understands the being 
rather than as substance by its relation to others.71 As Schulthess points out: 
 
If you want to make an unknown known in the algebra, i.e. in the case 
of equation systems, you will have to use the method of relations 
(habitudo). That is to express the unknown by its relations to the known 
or given. This method based on mathematics is the core of the concept 
of the mathesis universalis in Descartes’ Regulae.72 
 
Leibniz goes one step further than Descartes when he understands calculus as 
something that establishes relationships by converting formulas. In doing this, Leibniz 
reduces content-based reasoning to a semiotic-syntactic notion of reasoning.73 
  And this is the sense in which the Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum enabled 
the new developments in mathematics previously alluded to. Although all participants 
of the debate abide by the tenets of Aristotelianism, the debate develops its own 
dynamics:  arguments  and  concepts  emerge  that  finally  challenge  Aristotelianism, 
particularly the idea of abstraction and its implications.  
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